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Even the most unblinking advocate of free markets
accepts that the state must ensure the provision of some
services to the citizenry. Whether by public or private
agencies, many such services must be provided through
what have been called 'street level' bureaucracies
(SLBs).2 They include, for example, departments of
police, education, health, and agricultural extension.
The operators of these departments (the police
constables, classroom teachers, and agricultural
extension agents who do the work that justifies the
existence of the organization) have several features of
their work in common. (1) They interact daily with
citizen-clients in the course of their jobs. (2) They have
substantial discretion in the execution of their work.
(3) How they use their discretion is not closely
monitorable after the fact, in the sense that it is difficult
to identify precisely the results of what they do or do
not do.
From the perspective of the 'new economics of
organization',3 we would expect massive problems in
such organizations. This new approach rests on the
assumptions that (1) all bureaucracies can be treated as
arenas in which the occupants of particular roles
(owners, managers, operatives) create networks of
contractual arrangements which allow each to
maximize their own self-interest, (2) these individuals
have no lasting commitments to goals other than the
maximization of their own self-interest, and (3) they
relate to others either as a 'principal' or as an 'agent' of a
principal (a principal in relation to a subordinate, an
agent in relation to a superior), and in their agent role
they tend to shirk (do too little work) or subvert (do the
wrong work) if they can get away with it. The approach
focuses attention on how contracts and monitoring
systems are more, or less, effective in checking the
universal propensity of agents to shirk or subvert.
From this perpective, the wonder about SLBs is that
they do any work at all.
For all the bleakness of its assumption about human
nature, the approach does have its uses. It brings
questions of incentives and monitoring to the centre of
attention, away from the margins where the more
sociological theories of organizations have consigned
I This paper is based on field work in Andhra Pradesh in 1975-82 and
in Korea in 1979. See further Robert Wade, 1982, Irrigation and
Agricultural Politics in South Korea, Boulder: Westview; and 1982,
'The management of irrigation systems - how to evoke trust and
avoid Prisoner's Dilemma', World Development Vol 16 No 4,
pp 489-500.
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them. But having posed the questions, it answers them
with an excessively narrow range of possibilities. The
sense of mission, trust, fairness, comradeship towards
others who are similarly wed in a common 'community
of fate', and the cooperativeness in pursuit of
organizational goals which these qualities breed - the
possibility of generating these qualities other than
through the specification of individual contracts is
barely entertained. What matters is only getting the
details of the dyadic contracts right, such that at each
level the individual agent has a strong self-interest in
meeting the intentions of the principal to the
maximum. If that leads to cooperativeness and
teamwork, well and good. If it doesn't there is no point
in trying to design a structure and routines so as to
generate these qualities in other ways. But we need not
accept such a tight constraint on the range of
possibilities. We can use the general ideas of the new
economies of organization to guide an examination of
the detailed incentives under which - in this case -
street level bureaucrats work, without limiting our
attention to the mechanisms which this particular
approach embraces.
IRRIGATION
The organization for operating and maintaining a large
canal is a species of SLB. The operators (or 'patrollers')
patrol the channels to prevent interruptions in supply,
raise and lower the water gates, undertake light
maintenance work, and read the water gauges. The
engineer-managers supervise the patrollers, allocate
water between bigger units, and design and supervise
the maintenance work. The patrollers are generally
beyond any direct, visual supervision by the managers,
they have substantial discretion as to which tasks they
do when, and the tasks are difficult to specify in terms
of how 'adequately' they must be done. Further,
contact with farmers is a normal part of the job, and the
farmers are often uncooperative, wanting more water
than their share.
India and Korea have structured the patroller's
incentives very differently. It is difficult to know how
important organizational variables are in explaining the
'M. Lipsky, 1980, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the
Individual in Public Services, Russel Sage, New York
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big difference in the productivity of canal irrigated
agriculture in the two countries; climate and scale of
system also differ hugely, not to mention culture. But
there is not much doubt that India suffers from a form
of canal organization which allows the assumptions of
the new economics of organization full reign, and that
some improvements in agricultural performance could
be brought about without massive capital investment
through organizational changes.4 Comparison of the
Indian and Korean forms of organization can help to
stimulate thinking about what these changes might be.
Space constraints preclude a full-blown comparison.
We shall consider only the patroller, and the overall
structure of irrigation organization.
THE IRRIGATION PATROLLER IN INDIA AND
KOREA
In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh the recruitment
and posting of patrollers is governed by several rules.
(1) He must be full-time, not part-time; so he cannot
farm more than marginal amounts of land. (2) He is
selected by the engineer-manager responsible for the
subdivision in which he will work. (3) He is employed
'permanently', after a probation. (4) He must be
rotated to another post every six years (involving a shift
in residence of several miles at the last). (5) He must not
be posted in the jurisdiction which includes his native
village.
The Korean rules neatly tip the Indian ones on their
head. (1) The patroller must be a part-time farmer, so
that he experiences the problems of irrigation at first
hand. (2) He is nominated by the headmen of the
villages within his jurisdiction, and approved by the
irrigation bureaucracy. (3) He must be renominated
every year. (4) He is not posted from one place to
another; because (5) his land and residence must be
within his own jurisdiction.
The thrust of the Indian rules is to minimize
identification between the patroller and the locality,
and maximize identification with the irrigation
bureaucracy with the 'bureaucracy' at large, but not
with particular individuals whether equals or superiors,
because those people are themselves being rotated from
place to place fairly frequently. The thrust of the
Korean rules is almost the reverse. The Korean rules
find people who will themselves suffer irrigation
difficultis along with all the other farmers in their
jurisdiction, who are 'embedded' with those other
farmers within a larger structure of personal relations
R. Wade and R. Chambers, 1980, 'Managing the main system: canal
irrigation's blind spot', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 15 No 39,
Review of Agriculture, December: 147-60.
'R. Wade, 1985, 'On the sociology of irrigation statistics: how do we
know the truth about canal irrigation?', AgriculturalAdministration,
Vol 19 No 2: 63-79.
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and social networks, and who are accountable in a
direct way to the leaders among those other farmers.
Consider next the supervision arrangements. The
Indian ones are classic Weberian. Some five or six
patrollers with continguous jurisdiction are supervised
by a foreman. Four or five foremen are supervised by a
Supervisor, and so on up in nested geographical
jurisdictions. The Korean ones, on the other hand,
would make Weber turn in his grave. Each non-
patroller employee of the canal organization has a
responsibility to supervise one patroller, in addition to
other duties. Once or twice a week, without
notification, they travel to the patroller's area during
the hours when he is supposed to be on the job, to
ensure that he is there and perhaps stop for a chat. The
organization provides light motorcycles for staff to
travel to and from their supervisory jurisdictions. This
is of course a very expensive method of supervision, for
it entails massive redundancy of staff travelling up and
down the command area. But it also has an interesting
consequence for information. Instead of information
about the command area travelling up a hierarchy,
being distorted at each level, information about the
command area comes into the canal organization at all
levels. It is. common for staff en route to see their
patroller to stop and chat to groups of farmers whether
inside or outside their own particular supervisory
jurisdiction. In this way information is dehierarchalized.
This is all the more important because there are no
formal mechanisms of consultation between farmers
and irrigation staff; in terms of the formal organization
chart the farmers are completely excluded.
They are also formally excluded in India; but there the
information system is much more hierarchical, with
people at one level having some monopoly over the
supply of information to higher levels.5 The monopoly
power of information provision helps staff at each level
to enlarge their discretion over what it would otherwise
be. And since they are engaged in allocating a vital
resource whose cost to the farmers is often much less
than they would be prepated to pay rather than go
without, the staff can make use of their discretion to
earn large amounts of illicit money.6
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN INDIA
AND KOREA
These differences are in turn part of a wider structural
difference in organizational design. The Indian system
uses a single vast hierarchy for designing, supervising
'R. Wade, 1982, 'The system of political and administrative
corruption: canal irrigation in South India', Journal of Development
Studies, Vol 18 No 3: 287-328; 1985, 'The market for public office:
why the Indian state is not better at development', World
Development, Vol 13 No 4, 1985: 467-497.
the construction, and operating and maintaining all
canal systems in a state (Andhra Pradesh's Irrigation
department has about 40,000 employees, in a state of
roughly 40 million people). The patrollers at the
bottom are meant to be responsive upwards to higher
authorities in this hierarchy, not responsive laterally to
particular groups of farmers. But even at the level of the
engineer-managers, and still more so at the level of the
operatives, no attempt is made to foster integration of
the hierarchy by other than material means, by other
than the dependence of individuals on the Irrigation
department for their salary. In practice there is a strong
social and economic cleavage between operatives and
the engineer-managers, with operatives in practice
identifying much more closely with local people than
with the hierarchy.
In Korea, too, there is a similar cleavage between
operatives and staff of the canal organization. The
differences with India are, first, that the rules of
patroller selection are such as to regularize this local
identification, making the patroller accountable to a
generic rather than particularistic local interest
(through renomination by the village heads); and
second, that the staff other than the patrollers are
knitted into a cohesive organization. Unlike an Indian
state there is no single hierarchy for the whole country.
Each system or each watershed has its own parastatal
canal organization, while design and construction is
handled by a national organization. The watershed-
based canal organizations (misleadingly called
'associations') draw their staff from their own area, and
depend for most of their operating budget on farmers'
water payments. There is much less marking out of
rank differences within the organization than there is in
India, in terms of dress, vehicles, and other prequisites.
It is quite normal for everyone - sometimes excepting
the President, appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture
in the case of the bigger canals and normally the only
non-local on the staff - to eat lunch together in the
same lunchroom. On top of these aids to organizational
cohesion, a variety of collectivity-enhancing methods
are used, ranging from athletic competitions between
organizational subdivisions to massed callisthenics in
the forecourt of the headquarter's building every
Friday morning.
WHAT MIGHT INDIA LEARN FROM KOREA?
Massed callisthenics in the forecourt in India? The
sheer difficulty of imagining the staff of an irrigation
subdivision assembling at subdivisional headquarters
for morning callisthenics raises the question of
organizational transfer in vivid form. Behind the
See J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge: 300-321.
See Wade, 1988, Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective
Action in South India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for
evidence on low trust in rural India; and H. Triandis, et al., 1972, The
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transfer question is one more basic still, which is the
extent to which organizational structure determines
organizational behaviour.
Many sociologists would say: not much. They would
stress the influence of the 'environment' outside the
organization on behaviour within it, and so on the
organization's performance of its central tasks. One
quite plausible line of argument might go as follows;
effective performance of organizations-in-general,
including irrigation bureaucracies, is inversely related
to the magnitude of opportunistic behaviour by the
staff. Opportunistic behaviour is related not only to the
details of principal-agent contracts (as in the new
economics of organization), but also and inversely to
the amount of 'social capital' in the organization and in
the wider community in which it operates. Social
capital here refers to trust, norms of reciprocity and
social networks.7 In other words, the greater the
amount of social capital in an organization and in its
wider community, the greater the likelihood that
organizational members will behave cooperatively, and
so the better the organizational performance (measured
in our case by water to the fields).
To assess the likelihood that a Korean-type irrigation
structure would indeed generate improved irrigation
performance in India we need to know, therefore, the
extent to which the amount of social capital in an
organization is a function of the amount in the
organization's environment, and the extent to which it
is a function of the structure of that particular
organization. In the Korea-India comparison, it is
likely - I know of no evidence - that social capital in
Korean rural districts has for many decades been
higher than in Indian rural districts. (One could
examine evidence on various forms of mutual aid
practices, such as rotating credit associations, which
require high levels of trust and in turn generate some
more; and evidence on word association tests, which
show that in India the idea of 'trust' is closely associated
with the idea of 'treachery'.)8
But in addition, the Korean type of irrigation structure
itself maximizes the spillover of community social
capital into the irrigation organization and then
generates more inside the organization, while the
Indian structure minimizes it. The Korean type does so
by drawing its staff from the local area, where they and
their familes, kin and neighbours have repeated
exchange over long periods of time. This, we know,
tends to encourage the development of trust and a norm
of generalized reciprocity, and to discourage
malfeasance.9 Interactions at work, where the
Analysis of Subjective Culture, Wiley-Interscience, New York
Mark Granovetter, 1985, 'Economic action and social structure: the
problem of embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, Vol 91:
481-510
individual deals with the same set of perhaps 50 to 150
people for most of his career, have a reinforcing effect.
Of course, this is not the end of the Korean story; if it
were, we would not know why such embeddedness in
local networks and repeated interactions within the
organization did not generate cosily corrupt irrigation
organizations devoted to maximizing the rental income
of the staff, which is the haunting Indian fear. The
Korean irrigation parastatals are subject to quite severe
inspections from nationally-based organizations at
fairly frequent and often irregular intervals. And all
Korean organizations operate in a climate of
enveloping threat from the North, and in an
authoritarian political structure. (But authoritarian to
very different effect than in, say, Latin American
authoritarianism, as seen in the densé and egalitarian
contact between irrigation staff and farmers engineered
through the patroller supervision arrangements.)
So there can be no strong presumption that the same
organizational structure in India would be operated in
much the same way. The point of the comparison is to
widen the range of options to consider in the Indian
case. It would be desirable to experiment with an
employment contract for patrollers more like the
Korean one; and, much more ambitiously, to
experiment with decentralized watershed-based
parastatals more like the Korean. There are good a
priori reasons for thinking that reforms in the Korean
direction would probably lead to better irrigation
performance, even though Indian canals are typically
far bigger than Korean ones. As the fiscal crisis of the
Indian state grinds worse and worse, organizational
change, offering the prospect of improved performance
without much accompanying capital expenditure,
becomes an increasingly attractive route to explore;
other options are running out. If such experiments
were attempted, it would be foolish not first to
understand the nuts and bolts of the Korean structure
- and not only the Korean, but also the Japanese and
Taiwanese, which are all the same family.
° Nelson and Winter, 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, Belknap Press, Boston
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But the point of the comparison is also to illustrate the
limits of the principal-agent approach to organizations.
Here we have two very differently structured
organizations for doing the same thing. They appear to
have significantly different effects on the extent of
shirking and subverting. The Indian form - with a
single tall hierarchy, a high cost of moving information,
and no connection between farmers' water payments
and staff salaries, for example - facilitates opportunistic
behaviour by both principals and agents towards each
other. The Korean form inhibits such behaviour,
instead generating higher levels of trust and
cooperativeness. Principal-agent theory, by contrast,
downplays the extent to which those features of
organizational design which are not reducible to
individual contracts affect the magnitude of
opportunistic behaviour; it has no concept of social
capital and its effects on cooperation; nor does it
consider the possibility that principals might behave
opportunistically towards agents, rather than vice
versa, a failure which would prompt a hollow laugh
from the field staff of Indian irrigation departments.
And notice something else. The Indian and Korean
forms of irrigation organization have remained
unchanged from the time they were created many
decades ago. It is difficult to argue that the Indian form
represents the most 'efficient' form in Indian
conditions. Yet principal-agent theory (and also the
related transactions cost approach) does incline
towards the view that organizations evolve in the
direction of greater efficiency. The absence of such a
trend in the Indian case may reflect the fact that the
organization is publicly owned and dependent on the
state budget for its revenue rather than on sale of
services. It is not exposed to competition from other
organizations. But almost certainly there is more to its
inertia than this. Perhaps Richard Nelson and Sidney
Winter's book, 'An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change','° with its emphasis on accident and path-
dependence, is a more useful guide.
